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IN THE

SUPREME CO:URT

EARL RICH,·

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
-vsERNEST ELDER,

Case
No. 8671

Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Brief plaintiff, Earl Rich, will be
referred to as plain tiff and defendant, Ernest Elder,
will be referred to as defendant or Elder.
This appeal arises out of a judgment in the amount
of $992.34 against the defendant and in favor of plaintiff entered on ·the 13th day of February, 1957. From
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
defendant Elder prosecutes this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic question from which this appeal was
taken concerned the finding of the Trial Court that
plaintiff was employed by defendant from approximately
the lOth day of July, 1956 to the 18th day of July, 1957
and whether or not the plaintiff has earned a bonus.
All agreements between plaintiff and defendant
were oral.
From November of 1955 through the 15th day of
June, 1956 defendant employed plaintiff on his ranch
in Carbon and Duchesne Counties. Defendant paid
plaintiff $200.00 a month and paid plaintiff's wife a sum
of $1.00 per person per day for any employees of defendant who boarded with plaintiff.
On June 15, 1956 the ranch was sold and possession delivered to the other defendant, M. H. Sharp. In
conjunction with the transfer of the ranch, a herd of
cattle, which were formerly owned by defendant were
transferred to Sharp. Plaintiff was informed that from
and after the 15th day of June his employment would
be with M. H. Sharp. <R.61) Plaintiff and Sharp testified that Elder said that after certain hay was up then
the cattle which were transferred to Sharp would have
to be gathered and defendant would pay for the gathering. <R.61) Defendant denies that he agreed to pay for
the gathering.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
From the 15th day of June, 1956 to approximately
the 6th day of July, 1956 plaintiff was in the employee
of Sharp. On the lOth day of July, 1956 plaintiff claims
that he returned to the employment of defendant. That
he remained in the employment of defendant from the
lOth of July to the 18th of July and hired other people to
work for Elder and incurred obligations for their food and
incidental expenses on behalf of Elder. On the 26th of
July plaintiff was again back in the employment of Sharp
and assisted Sharp in the removal of certain of the cattle
sold and delivered by Elder to Sharp on the 15th of June,
1956. Defendant Elder denies that he ever employed
plaintiff after the 15th of June and from that time on
whatever work was done on the ranch in Carbon and
Duchesne Counties or with cattle transferred was on
behalf of Sharp.
Concerning the bonus. On January 17, 1956 defendant wrote to the plaintiff and made an offer which
is contained in plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, the offer contained the following language:
"In any event I would be willing to agree to
pay you in addition to salary $500.00 if at any
time I sold the property."
The letter contained several other matters upon which
there was indicated it would be necessary to have a
meeting of the minds between plaintiff and defendant
and closed with the following phrase:
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"Let me hear from you."
Plaintiff never did respond to the letter of January 17,
1956. He continued on the ranch of defendant up
through the 15th of June, 1956. During the month of
March, 1956 defendant contemplated the employment
of another person to take over the operation of the ranch
and to be foreman over plaintiff, but the employment was
not consumated because the employee could not come
to work.
On June 15th plaintiff was paid by defendant and
no mention was made of the bonus or any claim for it
by the plaintiff. The June 15th payment was the last
payment that was ever made by defendant to plaintiff.
Thereafter there were conversations between plaintiff and
defendant concerning the work which plaintiff did between the lOth day of July and the 18th of July. Plaintiff was making demands upon the defendant for the
sums he claimed due for his wages and for monies which
he claimed to have obligated defendant to pay. In none
of these conversations was there any discussion of the
bonus which plaintiff claimed and which tl1e Trial Court
awarded him.
The position of the defendant concerning the
claim for wages was that the work performed from the
lOth of July to the 18th of July was performed for Sharp.
It consisted of the gathering of cattle owned by Sharp
on which he sought a count both to check the nu1nber
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of cattle sold by defendant in June of 1956 and also so
that a loan could be negotiated.
Defendant's position concerning the bonus was
that while the bonus was discussed with plaintiff there
never was any bonus become due. First, defendant
never had agreed to pay the bonus which was offered
on January 17, 1956. Second, that the bonus was contingent upon the plaintiff rendering faithful, loyal and
expert services to the defendant in the handling of the
Nine Mile Ranch and the cattle thereon, and plaintiff
did not render faithful. loyal and expert service in the
handling of the cattle and refused to even discuss with
defendant the numbers of cattle there were handled on
the ranch. He failed to reveal to defendant exactly what
had happened during the spring of 1956. It was also
defendant's position that the bonus was contingent upon
plaintiff not continuing in the employment of any transferee of the Nine Mile Ranch.
The only evidence concerning the obligations of defendant to pay plaintiff for the work performed between
the lOth of July and the 18th of July and to show plaintiff's authority to obligate defendant to pay additional
wages were two conversations. The conversations occurred, one on the 15th of June, 1956 and the other on
the 4th of July, 1956. The conversation of July 4th was
by telephone. Plaintiff called defendant from Price, Utah.
Plaintiff claims that defendant agreed to employ him to
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gather cattle and authorized him to employ anybody
he saw fit to assist him. It is undisputed during the conversation defendant limited any expenditure on the part
of plaintiff for food and supplies to $25.00.
Between the lOth of July and the 18th of July plaintiff and several other men employed by him gathered
certain of the cattle which were conveyed by defendant
to Sharp. Present during the time that the cattle were
gathered were the plaintiff, persons employed by him
and Sharp. On the last day of the gather, the day that
the count was to be made John Holmquist, a representative of Sharp's lending agency and Robert Elder, defendant's seventeen year old son, were present. Defendant stayed away intentionally because he did not believe a count feasible.
Defendant has steadfastly denied that he ever authorized plaintiff to employ anyone on his behalf or employed plaintiff to gather the cattle belonging to Sharp
on the lOth of July, 1956.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
N·O CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS EVER
SHOWN BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION TO DEFENDANT
FOR TI-lE 'CLAIMED PROMISE TO PAY THE COST OF
Tf-IE GATHERING.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
POINT III
THAT TI-IE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW ANY ACCEPTANCE BY PLAINTIFF OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER TO
PAY A BONUS WHI'CH WAS CONTAINED IN THE LETTER
OF JANUARY 17, 19'56.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RENDER FAITHFUL, LOYAL
AND EXPERT SERVICES TO THE DEFENDANT AND AS
A CONSEQUENCE DOES N~OT HAVE GROUNDS TO
CLAIM A BONUS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS EVER
SHOWN BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.

The evidence which was presented by plaintiff and
corroborated by the defendant Sharp at no place shows
an offer by the defendant, Elder, to employ plaintiff for
the purpose of gathering the cattle which had been transferred to Sharp. The evidence comes only from the
mouths of plaintiff and Sharp.
The conversation on June 15, 1956 as recalled by
plaintiff was as follows:

"Q. Mr. Elder told you what?
A. Told me that as of July 15th, June 15th
it was, that I was on the ranch, that I was workfor Mr. Sharp. That all the responsibility was
his. The expense. And we had the hay to put
up then and he said they wanted me to go ahead
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and put the hay up as fast as I could, and then
they'd have to have the cows counted on the
mountain. As quick as I could get the hay up I
was to go to the mountain and gather the cows
for the count.
Q. All right, what else was said?
A. As I remember it, Mr. Sharp come in then
and he said when they go to the mountain to
gather the cows they were working for you then.
Mr. Elder said yes." (R.61)
The second conversation concerning the hiring of
plaintiff was a telephone conversation between plaintiff
and defendant. Concerning the conversation, plaintiff
testifies as follows:
"Q. How did Mr. Sharp happen to be there?
Had you made arrangements for him to meet you
there?
A. No. I was there, I stopped there at the
service station.
Q. In Wellington?
A. Yes. When I, I saw his truck coming
down the road.
Q. You saw Mr. Sharp's truck?
A. Yes. So I hailed him down.
Q. All right. Now proceed and tell me what
you stated to Mr. Elder and what he stated to you.
A. Well I don't remember exactly but I told
him that we had the hay up and I was ready to
go to the mountain to gather the cows. And he,
well I asked him about hiring all the men I could
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get to go up to gather them. And he said all right.
Then I asked him about grub, groceries. And he
said that I could come to Price and charge to him
a bill of groceries to the extent of $25. That was
about all that was said." (R.63)
In the cross examination plaintiff further elaborated
concerning his conversation with the defendant as follows:
"Q. Mr. Rich, let's see if we can get a few of
these details down. You say you just happened
to be at Wellington on the Fourth of July and
made this call to Mr. Elder? About hiring these
men?
A. Approximately after the Fourth of July,
and I didn't happen to be here, I was here for the
purpose of getting ready for that gather.
Q. And Mr. Sharp happened to come along
in his truck?
A. I don't know on his part how he happened to be there, but I seen him coming down
the road.
Q. Well this call that you made now, Mr.
Rich, you were in doubt as to whether or not you
had any authority to hire anybody on behalf of
Mr. Elder or authority to charge any groceries
to his account or act in any way on his behalf
didn't you?
A. I was not.
Q. You just, well then why were you calling
him from Wellington to Salt Lake City if you
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had no doubt about your authority?
A. To get him to confirm my authority to
do it. Once more.

Q. Once more, is that right?
A. Yes." <R.66)
It appears from the testimony of plaintiff when
taken in its light most favorable to him that at no place
had there been authorization to pay for the gathering
of the cattle which were, at the time they were gathered,
the property of Sharp. At best the conversations only
indicate a willingness on the part of Elder that the gather
be conducted at that time.
It seems strange that a person \vho would be responsible for the expense incurred would authorize the
employment of an unlimited number of men to undertake to gather cattle belonging to another person. This
is not the situation where the evidence is clear there was
a mutual assent to the employment of plaintiff. The
conversations did not take the form of an offer to employ and an acceptance of the offer.
Defendant denies that he ever employed plaintiff
or authorized him to employ other persons on his behalf.
Plaintiff and Sharp seek to show an agreement by Elder
to pay for handling and gatl1ering of Sharp's cattle.
Plaintiff, at the time, \vas actually in possession of and
handling property of Sharp and in his employ1nent. The
evidence is clear and is in fact undisputed that on the
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15th of June plaintiff's employment with defendant was
terminated and he was paid in full on that day for the
services rendered.
Concerning the termination of services plaintiff stated as follows:

"Q. And you had a settlement with Mr.
Elder on the 15th of June didn't you?
A. For the time being.
Q. You got a check from him?
A. I did.
Q. And you considered and knew and understood that to be payment in full for the services
you had rendered him?
A. That's right, up until that time." (R.68)
The employment claimed by plaintiff which commenced on the lOth of July was necessarily a new employment and for a specific job. No limitation was placed
upon the plaintiff concerning the number of men he
could hire, the time he could spend and the manner
that he could proceed to accomplish the work. No limtations were placed, no control reserved or exercised.
Plaintiff was handling Sharp's property and Sharp was
present to supervise and control the operations.
Sharp was present at both the conversations. It
was in his interest that the gathering of his cattle be
accomplished. Would the owner of cattle permit a person, not his employee, to roundup, handle and move on
his range his cattle without having control over him and
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
without being the party whose authority was being exercised?
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence considered as whole does not show a contract of employment by defendant.
POINT II
T'HERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION TO DEFENDANT
FOR TilE 'CLAIMED PROMISE TO PAY THE COST OF
THE GATHERING.

The agreements marked Exhibit "A" and "B" transferred on 15th of June, 1956, all of the cattle on the Nine
Mile Ranch and all of the forest, ranges, and ranch properities belonging thereto to the exclusive jurisdiction of
Sharp.
The agreement, Exhibit "A", did not require that
plaintiff count the cattle which were sold to Sharp but
only provided that in the event a physical count of such
livestock should show that there was not the minimum
number and kind of livestock guaranteed an allowance
would be made for the shortage. The agreement also
provided that the closing date would be the first of July,
1956. Prior to that day on June 18, 1956 the cattle were
accepted as to the contract by Sharp. See handwritten
addition to the agreement Exhibit "A". Actually the
work which was accomplished by plaintiff between the
lOth of July and the 18th of July, 1956 had no value of
any kind to the defendant Elder. The cattle counted
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belonged to Sharp. He was anxious to know the number
so that a loan could be made.
Elder did not believe a count feasible as an accurate
check, Sharp insisted, however, on going ahead; Elder
got nothing from what is now claimed to be his obligations.
The evidence shows that plaintiff was working for
Sharp from the 15th of June through the 6th of July,
1956, putting up the hay on his ranch. The conversation
of the 4th of July was therefore made bet,ween an employee of Sharp and Elder. The employees of Sharp were
actually, in part, the same people who went upon the
range and assisted plaintiff in the rounding up the catt~e.
POINT III
THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SI-IO·W ANY ACCEPTANCE BY PLAINTIFF OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER TO
PAY A BONUS WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN THE LETTER
OF JANUARY 17, 1956.

The only evidence concerning a bonus which was
presented by plaintiff was the letter of January 17, 1956.
There can be no question about the letter having been
written and its contents speak for themselves. It was
admitted by plaintiff that he did not answer the offer
made in the letter. At no time did he ever indicate that
he would accept the terms and conditions of the letter.
In March, 1956 defendant contemplated the hiring, and
actually had made arrangements to hire, another person
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to supersede plaintiff on the ranch and to take over the
management of the cattle operation. The new foreman
accepted other employment so there was no replacement
for plaintiff.
When plaintiff was paid off on June 15, 1956 he
freely admitted that the check given him on that date
which did not take into account any bonus was in full
payment for the services which he had rendered to Elder
to that time.
Prior to the filing of the complaint Rich never made
any claim for the bonus. On June 15, 1956 Sharp employed Rich to continue in his employment with him.
One of the purposes of the offer made by Elder of the
bonus was to insure that Rich would have continuous
employment on the ranch either by himself or by a successor.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RENDER FAITHFUL, LOYAL
AND EXPERT SERVICES TO THE DEFENDANT AND AS
A CONSEQUENCE DOES NOT HAVE GROUNDS TO
CLAIM A BONUS.

Following the transfer of the property by Elder to
Sharp and the attempted count by Sharp of the cattle
which were sold to him there arose a dispute over the
number of cattle which were on the ranch on June IS,
1956. Elder was desirous of getting whatever reliable
information he could concerning the number of cattle
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that were handled by plaintiff during 1956.
Plaintiff stated that he did not keep a record which
could be relied upon concerning the number of cat~tle
handled. When asked to give his opinion of the number
of cattle which were on the range in an affidavit he refused. Even though Elder, at the time, was willing to
assume part of the expense of the gathering if an affidavit was given. This refusal by plaintiff to disclose information concerning his employer's business and necessary to the best interest of his employer demonstrates
a complete lack of loyalty and faithfulness, to the party
he claimed employed him.
Plaintiff claimed to be employed by Elder at all
times prior to June 15th and from the 1Oth to the 18th
of July to count cattle. Yet when asked to give an opinion
concerning the number of cattle he thought were on the
ranges he refused.
The law seems to be clear that an employee owes
to his employer, whether the contract of employment
specifically set it forth or not a duty of loyalty and faithfulness. Carpenter Steel Co. v Norcross, 204 F. 537,
35 Am. fur. Sec. 40 P. 473.
A failure on the part of an employee to render faithful service may prevent his recovery of compensation for
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service. In fact the rendering of faithful service is a condition precedent to the right to recover wages. Sipley
v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 76 N.E. 226, annotated at
5 Ann. Cas. 611.
The employees failure to perform his contract of
employment in failing to render faithful service may be
asserted as a partial or complete defense in an action to
recover his salary. Neely v. Wilmore, 124 Ark. 460, 187
S.W. 637, 35 Am. Jur. Sec. 72 P. 502.
A cursory examination of the testimony shows a
completely hostile attitude on th~ -part of plaintiff toward defendant. On the 26th of July plaintiff rounded up
some of the cattle he had gathered and loaded them on
trucks at the ranch. Sharp, on August 9, 1956, before
defendant attempted to obtain the affidavit from plaintiff had signed Exhibit B. The Exhibit contains a covenant that Sharp had not removed any cattle from the
Freed Ranch to that time.
When the conversation between plaintiff and defendant occurred and the affidavit concerning the number
of cattle on the ranch was requested plaintiff knew of
the removal of cattle on July 26th. His failure tD mention this vital fact demonstrates better than words his
lack of loyalty or faithfulness. Why should an honest
employee refuse his employer's request for a sworn stateSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ment concerning the vital facts which he alone knew
unless he was hiding from his employer what he knew,
and acting against the employer's best interest. The
actions of plaintiff seem even more strange when it is
considered in the light of defendant's offer to pay $200.00
on the account if the affidavit were given. Certainly an
employer should be entitled to the information in the
possession of his employee in a form on which reliance
can be placed. Plaintiff demonstrated to whom his loyalty
ran when he attempted to aid Sharp in concealing the
removal of cattle on July 26, 1956. The evidence is consistent which only one finding that plaintiff was working
for Sharp and not Elder. His actions show to whom his
loyalty and faithfulness extended, and it is not defendant.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in
this action does not establish a definite contract of employment. There was no consideration to Elder for the
employment of plaintiff. The great preponderance of
the evidence shows that Elder is a victim of conspiracy
between Sharp and the plaintiff. No offer to pay bonus
was ever accepted by Rich and no faithful, loyal and
efficient service entitling Rich to the claimed wages or
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a bonus has been rendered to Elder. This Court should
reverse the judgment of the lower Court and order that
judgment be entered in favor of ·defendant and against
plaintiff for no cause for action.

Respectfully submitted,

DWIGHT L. KING

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

